

# High-dimensional quantum key distribution rates for multiple measurement bases

hhu.



N. Wyderka<sup>1</sup>, G. Chesi<sup>2</sup>, H. Kampermann<sup>1</sup>, C. Macchiavello<sup>2</sup> and D. Bruß<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Institut für Theoretische Physik III, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstr. 1, D-40225 Düsseldorf, Germany

<sup>2</sup>Dipartimento di Fisica, Università degli Studi di Pavia, Via Agostino Bassi 6, 27100 Pavia, Italy

Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols take at least two advantages from high-dimensional (HD) systems: the secret key rate scaling as the dimension and the opportunity of exploiting more than two mutually-unbiased bases (MUBs). Indeed, if the dimension  $d$  of the system is a prime power, then  $d + 1$  MUBs exist. Here, we retrieve analytic key rates for a BBM92-like protocol where the dimension of the Hilbert space is generic and different numbers  $m$  of MUBs are considered. Surprisingly, in the *finite-key* scenario, we find that the highest key rate is obtained by exploiting just *three* MUBs.

## Protocol


### Preparation

$$|\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{H}_{ABE}$$

$$|\phi^+\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |jj\rangle$$

$$|\phi_{\alpha,\beta}\rangle = (I \otimes \hat{X}^\alpha \hat{Z}^\beta) |\phi^+\rangle$$

$$\rho_{AB} = \sum_{\alpha,\beta} \lambda_{\alpha,\beta} |\phi_{\alpha,\beta}\rangle \langle \phi_{\alpha,\beta}|$$



### Measurement

$$\hat{X} \equiv \sum_j |j\rangle \langle j-1|$$

$$\hat{Z} \equiv \sum_j e^{\frac{2\pi i}{d} j} |j\rangle \langle j|$$

$$Q_Z \equiv 1 - \sum_j \langle jj | \rho_{AB} | jj \rangle = 1 - \sum_{\alpha=0}^{d-1} \lambda_{0,\alpha}$$

$$Q_{XZ^k} \equiv 1 - \sum_{\alpha=0}^{d-1} \lambda_{\alpha,k\alpha}$$

## Asymptotic key rates

Von Neumann entropy:  $H(A)_\rho = -\text{Tr}[\rho_A \log(\rho_A)]$



Devetak-Winter rate:  $r_\infty = H(R_A|E) - H(R_A|R_B)$

Conditional entropy:  $H(A|B)_\rho = H(AB)_\rho - H(B)_\rho$

$\min_{\rho_{AB}} \log d - H(A,B)_{\rho_{AB}}$  subject to  $Q_i$  as observed,  $i \in \{X, Z, XZ, \dots\}$

$$r_\infty^{(m=d+1)} = \log(d) + (1-q) \log(1-q) - q \log(d-1) + (q-Q_Z) \log(q-Q_Z) + \sum_{k=0}^{d-1} (q-Q_{XZ^k}) \log(q-Q_{XZ^k})$$

$$q \equiv \left( Q_Z + \sum_{k=0}^{m-2} Q_{XZ^k} \right) / (m-1)$$



## Finite key rates

Bound from the *entropic uncertainty relation* ( $m = 2$ ):

$$r \leq \underbrace{C}_{\text{incompatibility}} - \underbrace{h(\bar{Q} + \mu_\epsilon)}_{\text{max error tolerance}} - \underbrace{(\bar{Q} + \mu_\epsilon) \log(d-1)}_{\text{statistical uncertainty}} - \frac{1}{n} \left[ \underbrace{\text{leak}_{EC}}_{\text{leakages}} + \log\left(\frac{2}{\epsilon_{EC}}\right) + 2 \log\left(\frac{1}{2\epsilon_{PA}}\right) \right]_{\text{security parameters}}$$

Bounds from the *asymptotic equipartition property*:

$$r_{\text{col}} \leq \frac{n}{N} r_\infty^{(m)} (\bar{Q} + \mu_\epsilon) - \frac{1}{N} \left[ \log\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon_{EC} \epsilon_{PA}^2}\right) + 4\sqrt{n} \log(2 + \sqrt{d}) \sqrt{\log\left(\frac{2}{\epsilon^2}\right)} \right]$$

$$r_{\text{coh}} = r_{\text{col}} - \frac{2(d^4 - 1)}{N} \log(N + 1) \quad \left| \begin{array}{l} \text{coherent attacks} \\ \text{collective attacks} \end{array} \right.$$

